Abstract. Implementations of computer systems comprise many layers and employ a variety of programming languages. Building such systems requires support of an often complex, accompanying tool chain.
Introduction
We begin with a simple question: do we know how to formally verify software? At first, the answer would be 'yes', because (i) software consists of programs, (ii) ways to formally specify program behavior can be looked up in any textbook on programming language semantics, e.g., [1, 2] , (iii) it has been known since decades how to produce paper and pencil proofs for programs based on formal semantics [3, 4, 5] , and (iv) these proofs could be mechanically checked by a modern computer-aided verification (CAV) system. Thus, at least in principle the problem should be solved.
However, this is an oversimplification. Software engineering does not just deal with 'programs written in a programming language' but with complex software systems. These consist of many programs, which are written in different programming languages and interact with each other (and their environment) in nontrivial ways.
Thus, even the most benevolent software engineer would doubt the usefulness of software verification if programs requiring standard operating system services-e.g., file and terminal I/O, inter-process and network communicationcannot be handled. Even if such facilities could be handled, the verification results would be relative to the correctness of the underlying system and therefore questionable unless the hardware and the operating system (in particular its kernel and the device drivers) could also be verified.
In some software systems, errors have potentially disastrous consequences for body or purse and software correctness is particularly desirable. For example, security-critical systems implement cryptographic protocols to guarantee secrecy or authenticity of message exchange over untrusted networks. The systems controlling our cars, trains, or air planes are distributed and must meet hard real-time requirements.
The mission of the German Verisoft project [6] is to develop methods and an integrated set of tools permitting to handle all issues listed above and to demonstrate these by verifying entire systems of industrial interest. We call integrated sets of tools supporting the collaborative formal verification of computer systems (hardware plus software or software alone) system verification environments. Verification environments are themselves software systems, and like any substantial software system they should better have an architecture. This paper is about the architecture of such verification environments.
Present computer systems have a common structure: from the hardware to the applications they are organized in layers of abstraction with well-defined interfaces. For every pair of adjacent layers the lower system layer simulates the upper system layer and implements its interface. Any reasonable theory of correctness of concrete computer systems will reflect this structure. We will argue that this determines the architecture of system verification environments to a very large extent. As an example we will describe in this article the environment that was developed and is currently being used in the Verisoft project. We also announce a web site, where we expose those portions of this environment (including constructions and formal proofs) that appear sufficiently stable and do not contain confidential data of industry partners.
Overview. The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. In Sect. 2 we describe three concrete systems, which cannot be verified unless all the issues raised in the introduction are dealt with. These systems (and their requirements) were chosen together with Verisoft industry partners as concrete examples, whose complete formal verification should be made feasible by our system verification environment. Of course they will also serve as concrete examples in this paper.
Section 3 deals with computational models for describing the systems under consideration and their components. The range of these models is necessarily large, ranging from processors and devices at the low end via abstract C machines and operating systems to communicating distributed applications at the high
